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SUMMARY
Application of nuclear reactors in space will present operational problems unique
to this form of power generation. One such operational problem is the possibility of
high-velocity Earth impact of a fast-spectrum reactor. These reactors, because of
their high densities, can return to Earth and impact at speeds in excess of 305 meters
per second (1000 ft/sec).
This report examines the consequences of impacting a simulated fast reactor
against concrete at 328 meters per second (1075 ft/sec). The purpose of the study was
twofold; to experimentally determine the postimpact integrity of the spherical contain-
ment vessel surrounding the reactor model and to analytically examine the deformed
core to estimate the range of reactivity inserted as a result of the impact.
The results of the impact experiment and analytical analysis of the core show the
following: (1) Postimpact analysis of the steel containment vessel showed no leaks and
no observable cracks. (2) Deformation of the reactor core within the containment ves-
sel was extensive. Only an estimated 2. 7 percent of the total core volume void re-
mained in the core fuel pin structure. (3) The reactor pressure vessel was split open at
several locations revealing the inner portions of the core. (4) The analytical analysis
of the postimpact core configuration estimated the net range of reactivity inserted, due
to impact, to be from about 4.00 to 10. 25. (5) The larger the core eccentricity due to
compaction, the lower the possibility of the reactor going prompt critical. A similar
core voided of lithium with an eccentricity approaching 0.90 could be held (via control
drums) below the prompt critical conditions.
.
INTRODUCTION
As the exploration of space and the development of the Earth's resources from
space evolves through the 1980Ts and 1990's, the need for large amounts of electrical
power in Earth orbit will become increasingly important. Electrical power outputs one
or two orders of magnitude greater than presently available are predicted for such mis-
sions. Based on current technology, only nuclear reactors can supply the energy for
these large power requirements. The application of nuclear reactors in space, how-
ever, presents operational problems unique to this form of power generation. The
radiological hazards associated with the use of nuclear reactors in space appear to be
the prime operating constraint. For this reason it is essential that these hazards be
identified and evaluated.
The objective of this study is to identify and evaluate one such potential hazard - the
high velocity Earth impact of a fast-spectrum reactor core. This type of accident can
arise as the result of several operational malfunctions: (1) a launch phase abort,
(2) guidance malfunction prior to orbital insertion, or (3) random Earth re-entry from
orbit. When the mass to frontal area ratio of these reactors exceeds 3.5 newtons per
square centimeter (5 psi), impact velocities in excess of 305 meters per second (1000
ft/sec) are possible as a result of the malfunction.
The consequences of such a high-speed impact of a reactor core could be quite
severe. If we assume the reactor has been operated at design power for an appreciable
length of time, then a large fission product inventory has been accumulated. Safety con-
siderations require that the fuel and fission products of the reactor be contained at all
times, even during the impact event.
One method of containment under these severe conditions is to put the reactor in a
containment vessel and to design the vessel and its contents to absorb the impact energy
without rupturing the containment vessel. The energy of impact would be absorbed by
deformation of the containment vessel and the internal components of the vessel such as
the shielding and the reactor. At impact velocities approaching 328 meters per second
(1075 ft/sec) considerable deformation of the containment vessel and the reactor core
result. Core deformation, to the extent discussed in this report, alters the neutronics
of the system resulting in an insertion of reactivity. A ramp insertion of appreciable
magnitude can cause the reactor to go prompt critical, thereby attaining a very high
power level, a large fission product inventory, and high fuel temperatures with a re-
sultant fuel meltdown and eventual rupture of the containment vessel (ref. 1). There-
fore safety considerations require that the containment vessel be designed to absorb the
impact energy through deformation and that the reactor core within the containment ves-
sel not go critical as a result of this deformation.
This report will examine the deformed reactor core configuration and analytically
determine the amount of reactivity change generated by the impact accident.
DESCRIPTION OF SLED TESTS AND REACTOR
Sled Tests
The impact test was conducted at the Holloman Track in Alamogordo, New Mexico.
This is a dual rail track extending 10 880 meters (35 588 ft). Only 610 meters (2000 ft)
of the track was used for this test. The test setup is shown schematically in figure 1.
It consists of a pusher sled, pay load sled, culvert, and target.
The model is placed on a pay load sled (fig. 2). It is attached by nylon straps that
provide the support during sled operation. A pusher sled, containing four Genie motors
for its propulsion thrust, pushes the payload sled down the track (fig. 3). Having
reached predesigned speed, the pusher sled is stopped by water braking and momentum
exchange. The payload sled continues down the track propelled by 12 Zuni motors.
A culvert placed at the end of the track (fig. 4) is designed to separate the impact
model from the payload sled. This massive 10 000-kilogram (22 000-lb) structure is
welded from 7. 6- and 15. 2-centimeter (3- and 6-in.) armor plate. Knives are positioned
on the sled splitter to cut the nylon support straps and allow the impact model to pass
through. The payload sled is destroyed with each test by the culvert. Small shape
charges are also placed on the payload sled to initiate its destruction.
15.3 meters (50 ft) beyond the culvert is a concrete block (fig. 5), 1.5 meters (5 ft)
on a side weighing approximately 8150 kilograms (18 000 Ib). The impact model having
been separated from the payload sled continues a free-flight impacting against the con-
crete block. For this particular test, a rock was mounted on the concrete (not shown in
photograph). It measured about 15.2 centimeters (6 in.) in diameter by 10.2 centi-
meters (4 in.) high.
Movie cameras were mounted at the impact point (fig. 6). They operated at speeds
of 4545 and 9090 frames per second. Additional movies were taken from a helicopter in
real time and 250 frames per second showing the entire test sequence.
Reactor Model
The impact reactor model used for this test was a carbon steel, one-third scale
model of a conceptual uranium nitride fast-spectrum space-power reactor. A cross-
sectional view of the reactor model is shown in figure 7. One-hundred-and-ninety-three
carbon steel tubes with a 6. 35-millimeter (1/4-in.) outside diameter and a 0. 89-
millimeter (35-mil) wall thickness and a 12.1-centimeter (4.75-in.) length were used to
represent the reactor fuel pins. These pins were held in place by a cylindrical can with
a wall thickness of 1.14 millimeter (49 mil). Outside the fuel can, twelve 2. 54-
centimeter (1-in.) diameter carbon steel cylinders were used to represent the peripheral
control-drum elements. Steel bar stock was used in the interstices of the control drums
to simulate the remaining reflector and provide a snug fit for all the components. The
remainder of the reflector was represented by a 7.1-millimeter (280-mil) thick steel
cylinder. The pressure vessel was 4.75-millimeter (188-mil) thick, 17. 8-centimeter
(7-in.) outside-diameter carbon steel tubing cut to a 17. 8-centimeter (7-in.) length.
Top and bottom end plates 32-millimeter (1/8-in.) thick were welded into place. The
reactor model was then placed in the containment vessel as shown in figure 8. Sand and
salt with steel saddles were used to represent shielding material and to fill in the re-
maining void within the containment vessel.
The containment sphere consisted of two stainless steel 0.62-meter (2-ft) diameter
hemispheres. The total weight of the impact model was 522 kilograms (1150 Ib).
TEST RESULTS
The impact model was slung on the payload sled by nylon straps. It was oriented
such that the filler plug was up range from the impact point at about 45° to the horizontal.
In this position the impact occurred on the weld. This orientation also caused the im-
pact forces to be applied to the reactor core mockup perpendicular to its longitudinal
axis.
The rocket ignition point was at the 10 000-meter (32 850-ft) track station. Impact
of the sled with the culvert and subsequent release of the model occurred at the 10 600-
meter (34 790-ft) track station. The last speed recorded by the track sensors was
314 meters per second (1035 ft/sec).
On impact of the sled with the culvert, the model separated from the nylon sling and
passed through the culvert impacting with the concrete block 15. 2 meters (50 ft) beyond.
Figure 5 shows the culvert and concrete block before impact. Shape charges on the pay-
load sled initiated destruction of the sled with the culvert before impact. The position
of the culvert after the test is shown in figure 9. Little damage resulted to the culvert,
and it can be used for additional tests.
Impact velocity of the model with the concrete block, as measured by the high-speed
film was 328 meters per second (1075 ft/sec). This is an increase in velocity of 12. 2
meters per second (40 ft/sec) over that recorded just before impact of the sled with the
culvert. This increased velocity is due to the sling shot effect of the nylon strapping.
The model is retained in the sled by two sets of straps. Just before the impact of the
culvert with the payload sled, the cutter on the culvert severs the first set of straps
leaving the model momentarily suspended in the sled by the second set of straps, which
are still under tension.
Figure 9 also shows the concrete block and the containment vessel after impact.
The concrete block has been totally destroyed. The reinforcing bars are clearly shown.
The model came to rest at the base of the destroyed block indicating that after impact
the model dropped directly down. The high-speed motion pictures also showed that the
model penetrated the concrete block at impact.
Photographs of the impacted model are shown in figure 10. Deformation occurred
in both the impacted hemisphere and the hemisphere opposite from the direction of im-
pact. The weld is approximately 45° to the impacted face cutting across the impacted
face. The impacted face shows the impression of the rock that was mounted on the con-
crete. No traces of the rock could be found after the test due to the total destruction of
the concrete. No cracks were observed in the containment vessel both along the weld
and at the rock indentation.
A leak test was performed on the model. This test consists of pressurizing the
containment vessel to 34.5 newtons per square centimeter (50 psig) with helium gas.
The entire assembly is then encapsulated in a plastic bag; the interior of the bag is
probed for leaks using a mass spectrometer type of leak detector. No leaks were de-
tected.
Measurements were taken of the containment vessel. These measurements indicate
how much strain occurred. The maximum diameter occurred at the impacted face. It
was measured as 73.5 centimeters (29 in.), which is 12.7 centimeters (5 in.) greater
than the preimpact diameter. This is a diametral strain of 16 percent. It is of the same
magnitude as similar impacted models (refs. 2 to 5). The amount of deformation of 6/R
was measured as 0. 74 (where 6 is defined as the diameter of the vessel before impact
minus the height of the vessel after impact and R is the vessel radius before impact) .
Containment Vessel Sectioning
The containment vessel was cut with a carbon arc torch around its perimeter to lift
part of it away for the examination of the interior. Figure 11 shows the model after the
cut. The saddles and salt have been left undisturbed. Figure 12 shows the core after
the removal of the saddles and salt. It shows that impact occurred at less than 90° to
the longitudinal axis. Figure 13 shows the core removed from the containment vessel.
The physical dimensions of this core in the preimpacted condition are shown in figure 14.
The core takes on an odd shape because of the impact forces. The end reflectors
are solid and thick and do not deform when impacted longitudinally. The core of the
reactor model has some void in it and deforms into a flatter shape. The overall im-
pacted model then takes on a cylindrical geometry in the end reflectors and more of a
flat shape in the core region where void fraction exists. Sectioning of the core is shown
in figure 15. The core's hollow tubes have been compressed or collapsed to where there
is little void fraction. The control drums remain cylindrical since they are solid. The
outer walls of the core have split because of the large impact forces.
ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION AND RESULTS
The analytical analysis of the experimental results shown in the preceding sections
of this report were complicated because of (1) the extent of deformation of the reactor
configuration and (2) the material makeup of the original test model (fig. 14). Since the
original test model used in the experiment exhibited a 67-percent void fraction, the final
core compaction was more than would be experienced by a more realistic reactor model
with only about a 37-percent void fraction (27 percent void due to loss of lithium coolant
plus about 10 percent for fission product void). Therefore, the relative dimensions of
the postimpact test model shown in figure 15 could not be used. However, these experi-
mental results did give valuable data as to (1) the general elliptic shape of the postimpact
reactor core and (2) the postimpact core void fraction that could be expected from a
328 meter-per-second (1075 ft/sec) impact (about 2. 7 percent). Based on these data,
the following analytical approach was taken to determine the range of reactivity increases
that could be expected from this type of accident.
The first step was to establish a base case reactor configuration with dimensions ap-
proximately three times that of the impact test model used at Holloman Air Force Base
and a fuel loading such that the final eigenvalue is about equal to 0.985. This value cor-
responds to a core voided of lithium coolant. The calculations were made using the two-
dimensional transport DOT computer program (ref . 6). An r-z S.P-, four-group trans-
port calculation was assumed to yield sufficient accuracy for these calculations. The
GAM computer program (ref. 7) was used to generate the four-group cross sections used
in the transport calculations.
With the base case fuel loading and dimensions established, the next step was to de-
termine the maximum amount of reactivity gained by squeezing down the core void frac-
tion to the experimental postimpact void fraction of 2.7 percent. This was accomplished
by conserving the core masses for each region of the reactor and then reducing the cy-
lindrical radius of each region to the appropriate volume. A transport calculation for
this compacted cylinder then gave the maximum reactivity change that could be experi-
enced for a 2.7-percent core void fraction. The transport calculation showed that a
21.62-dollar ($) increase in reactivity was associated with the radially compacted cylin-
drical core.
The actual postimpact experimental model revealed an elliptic shape rather than cy-
lindrical. Therefore, the next step in the analysis was to deform the basic compacted
cylinder case into ellipses of increasing eccentricities and calculate the resulting eigen-
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value. This approach would then enable a separate determination of the neutron leakage
and related decrease in reactivity associated with the change in geometry. The results
of these calculations are shown in figure 16. The general characteristics of this curve
is about what one would expect. The low to intermediate values of eccentricity (0 to
0.70) show a relatively small change in reactivity. Beyond 0.70 eccentricity the slope
of the curve changes rapidly showing the strong leakage influence. The experimental
postimpact reactor model (fig. 15) exhibited an approximate elliptic eccentricity of 0. 84.
Since the reactor model experimentally compacted to a much flatter configuration (be-
cause of the preimpact void fraction of 62 percent) one could say that an eccentricity of
0. 84 would represent the upper limit for core compaction. The reactivity change asso-
ciated with this eccentricity is about 13.00 $ (from fig. 16). Since the original base
core cylindrical reactor started with a radius of about 14.40 centimeters (5.66 in.);
(K = 0.985), the family of ellipses applicable must initially have the semimajor axis
equal to or greater than 14.40 centimeters (5.66 in.). Therefore, the lower bound on
eccentricity (upper bound on reactivity) is an ellipse with a semimajor axis of 14.40
centimeters (5.66 in.) and a simiminor axis of 9.31 centimeters (367 in.). The ellipti-
cal eccentricity for this case was calculated to be 0. 595. This value of eccentricity cor-
responds to a reactivity change of about 19. 20 $. Thus, the total reactivity range for
this core compaction accident would certainly be less than 19. 20 $ and more than
13.00 $. If the basic reactor is subcritical by the worth of the lithium coolant (voided
core) or about 2.30 $ then the net positive range is 16.90 to 10.70 $. Since the effect
of the control drums was not considered in these calculations, the range of reactivity
change is still further reduced. Calculations made in reference 9 indicate that a shut-
down margin on the order of 6.65 $ could be expected for a reactor of this general na-
ture. Thus, the net excess reactivity change for this accident could be from 10. 25 to
4.05 $. From the data shown in figure 16 it would appear that it would be acceptable to
have the reactor core deform to eccentricies approaching 0.90. Cores voided of lithium
with eccentricies close to 0.90 would have the possibility of remaining below the prompt
critical condition.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A boiler plate model of a uranium nitride fast-spectrum reactor was impacted
against a concrete block at approximately 328 meters per second (1075 ft/sec), and the
resulting information used to analytically examine the total change in reactivity asso-
ciated with this event. The results of the impact experiment and the analytical analysis
of the core show the following:
1. Postimpact analysis of the steel containment vessel showed no leaks and no ob-
servable cracks.
2. Deformation of the reactor core within the containment vessel was extensive.
Only an estimated 2.7 percent of the total core volume void remained in the core fuel
pin structure.
3. The reactor pressure vessel was split open at several locations revealing the
inner portions of the core.
4. The analytical analysis of the postimpact core configuration estimated the net
range of reactivity inserted, as a result of impact, to be from about 4.00 to 10. 25 $.
5. The larger the core eccentricity due to compaction, the lower the possibility of
the reactor going prompt critical. A similar core voided of lithium coolant, with an
eccentricity approaching 0.90 could be held (by the control drums) below the prompt
critical conditions.
•
Lewis Research Center,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Cleveland, Ohio, June 28, 1973,
503-25.
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Figure 10. - Model - postimpact.
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Figure 13. - Core removed from containment vessel - postimpact.
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Figure 15. - Cross section of deformed reactor model.
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